Alexander Kanev
Meaning, A Prioricity and Reality: Wittgenstein’s Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Summary:
In recent years, largely due to the emergence of the so-called Therapeutic readings of the Tractatus,1 Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics has become a subject of hot debates. Arguably, three major issues divide Wittgenstein scholars. The first one is how Wittgenstein criticized traditional philosophy in the Tractatus. Did he espouse any doctrines in order to show that metaphysical utterances are nonsensical? Did he lay down necessary conditions for meaningful speaking? How are we to make sense of the penultimate remark of the Tractatus where Wittgenstein states that his own propositions are nonsensical? The next issue concerns Wittgenstein’s later criticisms of metaphysics. Notably, most interpreters of the Philosophical Investigations do not see any connection between what is arguably the central argument of the book—the famous rule-following argument—and his ‘deflationary’ conception of philosophy. So, many scholars doubt whether Wittgenstein’s rejection of metaphysics is sustained by well-developed arguments (cf. Soames 2003: 29). Those who think that he presents genuine arguments against the meaningfulness of philosophical contentions disagree on how to interpret their nature. Do they support philosophical theses? If not, then what kind of theses they support? Are they intended to support theses at all? The third issue is about the dis/continuity of Wittgenstein’s critique of traditional philosophy. Which of the Tractarian reasons for considering metaphysical questions nonsensical were maintained in Wittgenstein’s later work? Are his later criticisms of philosophical theorizing essentially different from the early ones? Did the Philosophical Investigations jettison the Tractarian strategy of attacking metaphysics?
